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Universal Charter Options: Providing a Competitive Advantage
for State Fnancial Institutions
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for financial modernization has become accepted
among banking industry members and related market participants
due to the experiences of the last few decades.' Increased
competition from non-bank institutions in the 1970s, relaxed
lending practices of the 1980s, and the mergers of the 1990s forced
bankers and legislators to recognize the market's demand for
change.' Congress began addressing the cries for deregulation
from the banking industry in 1980. Deregulation proceeded
incrementally over the next two decades, including the passage of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) Yet, some
bankers, legislators, and scholars argue that deregulation does not
address all the goals of financial modernization.' This assertion
suggests that while deregulation is a necessary part of financial
modernization, more affirmative steps must be taken in order to
achieve a level of financial modernization that corresponds to
market demands.6 One such affirmative approach is the universal
charter.7
1. See Bevis Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks:
The Case in Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895, 1896 (1997).
2. See Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future. 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 221,241-43, 248-49 (2000); Bill Shaw and John R. Rovlett, Reforming
the U.S. Banking Systenm Lessons froma Abroad, 14 N.C. J. Ift'l. LAW & COM. REG.
91,93 (1993).
3. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 19s0,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
4. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
5. See Michael P. Malloy, Banking in the Tnenty-First Centur', 25 J. CORP. L.
787,830 (2000).
6. See id.; see also Note, The New American Universal Bank, 110 HARv. L. REv.
1310 (1997) (describing debates within the banking industry regarding the bank
holding company (BHC) structure and the effects of artificial line-drawing between
the function of banks and other financial services institutions, such as economic
inefficiency). See generally Shaw & Rowlett, supra note 2 (comparing the American
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This Note presents a bank charter option that offers
depository institutions broader powers than they receive under
traditional charters. The Note also considers how this new brand
of charter, called a universal charter, advances the goal of
regulatory reform. Part II of this Note provides a backdrop for
understanding the context in which financial modernization is
taking place! Part III discusses the traditional role of charters in
the financial services industry with an emphasis on current
changes.9  Part IV introduces the universal charter option,
compares it with universal banking, and discusses examples of
universal chartering systems in the United States.' Part V
considers the possibility of adopting a universal charter in North
Carolina." Finally, the Note concludes that a universal charter is
more than just an option; it is the future of organizing and
regulating state-chartered depository institutions.'
II. FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION
A. Changes in Financial Services
The U.S. financial services industry has changed
significantly during the twentieth century.'3 Despite the separation
of commerce and banking in 1933, financial services have
integrated across "geographical, functional, and sectoral" lines.'4
However, the regulation of these services remains entrenched in
banking system with systems abroad and arguing for elimination of the dual banking
system, thereby enabling American banks to compete more effectively in the global
economy).
7. See ANTHONY SAUNDERS & INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES: WHAT COULD WE GAIN? WHAT COULD WE LOSE? 74 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1994). A "universal bank" permits a "high degree of integration" of
commercial and investment activities. Id. The term, "universal charter" refers to the
organizational documents under which a universal bank incorporates, or otherwise
organizes, and receives its powers. See infra notes 78-154.
8. See infra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 33-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 78-154 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 155-204 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 205-20 and accompanying text.
13. See Michael Taylor, The Search for a New Regulatory Paradigm, 49 MERCER
L. REV. 793 (1998).
14. Id.
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assumptions that have been disproved or that no longer apply."
These industrial developments challenge the traditional regulatory
framework and necessitate a new regulatory model that keeps
pace with a changing marketplace." Financial modernization
must, therefore, recognize the reality of the marketplace and
modify the regulation of the financial services industry by
reconciling this reality with the objectives of regulation. 7
B. Modernization in a Dual Banking System
Banking regulation in the United States is a complex and
non-uniform system of overlapping regulation.8 Its structure
derives from the existence of two competing sources of charters
and regulation. 9 In recent years, nationally chartered banks have
received increasingly broad powers from the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).2' As national charters gain
advantages, the initial choice between state and national charters
and the relative ease of converting a state charter to a national
charter make improving the benefits of state charters critical3'
This expansion of permissible banking activities to include non-
traditional activities challenged state legislatures to reevaluate
their own banking codes.'
The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS)
considered the passage of GLBA an optimal time for state
15. See id. (suggesting modernization of bank regulation).
16. Id. at 798 (contending that the structure of the financial services industry is
changing in such a way that requires regulatory adaptation).
17. See id. at 799-SCO.
18. Christian A. Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parit), and National Banks-The
Renascence of State Banking Powers, 26 LoY. U. CHI. LI. 351,354-55 (1995).
19. Id. at 355.
20. See David Harrison, Despite Reform Worries, Federal Charter Dominates,
Am. BANKER (June 1, 1999), at 1, 4 (noting that despite financial reform legislation
the national bank charters have been the charter of choice among large banks and
that more banks switch from state charters to "national charters than the other way
around").
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 24(seventh) (2000) amended by Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 103
Stat. 2160, 2226-27, 2241 (1994). The OCC is an office within the Treasury
Department that regulates National Banls. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
Congress's passage of GLBA provides another example of financial modernization in
the national financial industry. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
22. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 353.
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modernization.23 The CSBS and the State Bankers Association
crafted a comprehensive report that explained GLBA's effect on
state banking and proposed a state modernization initiative.2 4 The
group released the report, describing GLBA as a "'new beginning
for the nation's banking industry,"' with a CSBS statement at the
June 1999 annual meeting that, "'it was crucial that states take
charge of their own destiny, rather than wait for Congress to
act."'" According to the CSBS report, states have been the
primary source of product and financial service innovation and
have developed their own systems of functional regulation.26 The
report asserted that GLBA would alter the competitive
environment dramatically, giving states an incentive to modernize
state banking laws so that state-chartered banks can provide the
financial services their customers need.27
The group agreed that the strength of the state banking
system is its diversity and its ability to meet the specific needs of
their customers.28 A "one size fits all" approach would undermine
the state system's competitive advantage.29 Therefore, the group
offered guiding principles by which state bankers and legislators
can evaluate their state banking laws and apply to state charter
modernization.3" These affirmative steps, however, ultimately
23. See CSBS Unveils State Banking Guide After Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
BANKING POL'Y REP., Feb. 7, 2000, at 8, LEXIS, News Library, BNKPOL File
[hereinafter CSBS].
24. Id.
25. Id. at 8 (quoting an excerpt from the CSBS report).
26. Id. (asserting that GLBA was made possible by the expansion of powers
given by states to state-chartered institutions). GLBA adheres to functional
regulation, as opposed to entity regulation. See infra notes 92, 148 and accompanying
text.
27. CSBS supra note 23, at 8 (pointing out that, although GLBA addressed the
activities of nationally chartered banks and BHCs and did not require changes in
state banking laws, the Act interacts with state laws and provides "opportunities for
the state system to remain on the cutting edge of modernization").
28. Id.
29. Ellen C. Lamb, Charter 2000: Modernizing a Dual Banking System, BANKING
POL'Y REP., Oct. 18, 1999, at 1, LEXIS, News Library, BNKPOL File.
30. Id. The CSBS identified four key questions for bankers and policymakers to
ask of their state banking laws:
(1) Can financial institutions provide all the services they would
like to offer their customers? (2) Can financial institutions serve
their customers wherever their customers are? (3) Does the new
financial structure encourage new providers of credit to enter the
490 [Vol. 6
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depend on the evaluations states make of their own banking
systems and what they determine as appropriate responses." A
universal charter presents one strategy for modernizing the state
charter by focusing on the expansion of banking powers and
regulatory reform. 2
IL. CHARTERS
A. Generally
Depository institutions are chartered rather than
incorporated.3  Charters mainly fall into three categories:
commercial banks, savings associations, and credit unions.'
Acquiring a charter for a depository institution involves a distinct
process and subjects the institution to a considerable amount of
supervision by the charter issuer." The type of charter offers a
range of permissible activities that prospective organizers consider
when seeking to charter a depository institution."' The various
charters also impose different initial capital requirements and
other conditions for approval of the charter application.'
Traditionally, each category of depository institutions falls
under the supervision and examination of a regulator created
marketplace? (4) Does the structure provide comprehensive,
consistent, and effective supervision for a financial institution's
lines of business?
Id
31. Id. (considering that, from state to state, different services and products vaill
be desirable or politically feasible).
32. Id. (describing the Maine universal charter law that "created a vholesale
financial institution charter and granted all" commercial banks, savings banks, and
thrifts a uniform range of powers as the best example of states developing and
enacting modernization strategies); see infra note 86 and accompanying text.
33. See Hem N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the
Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 684-S6 (198) (asserting that
chartering is a hallmark of special-interest legislation). See generally C. Dawn
Causey, The Future of Nonbank Depository Financial Institutions, 3 N.C. BA'7 rw,:G
INST. 1 (1999) (describing differences among charter options and the minimal effect
charter distinctions have on consumers).
34. Michael P. Malloy, BANKING LAW & REG. § 2.1.1 (20t01), LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BNKGLR File.
35. 1&
36. Id.
37. Id.
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specifically for that type of chartered institution." Therefore,
within the banking system, regulation is administered by several
entities.39 Typically, one of three state regulatory authorities and a
primary federal regulator regulate state-chartered institutions.0
Such an arrangement for organizing, operating, and regulating
state-chartered depository institutions imposes burdens and costs
that disadvantage the state system.4
B. Charters in a Dual Banking System
As a result of the dual banking system, organizers must
also choose between a state and federal charter.42 Charter
requirements of the various regulators may be different, according
to whether state or federal laws apply.43 One distinction in
requirements is that nationally chartered banks must be members
of the Federal Reserve System, but state-chartered banks may join
voluntarily.' State and national charters may also differ in the
38. Id-
39. See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACrIviTIEs 181 (2001).
40. Id. at 125. Commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions are each
regulated by a particular regulatory agency. Id. at 1. In the national system, the
OCC, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA) are the state regulatory agency counterparts, respectively.
Id. at 125; see Taylor, supra note 13, at 795.
41. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 39, at 183.
42. See id. at 181-83 (describing the differences between charters as statutorily
based and discussing the placement of chartering authorities in competition with
respect to the bank chartering process).
43. See, e.g., National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (governing nationally chartered banks, although
significantly revised and amended since 1864); see supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
44. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); 12 U.S.C. §§ 222, 321 (2000). The Federal Reserve
Act empowered the Fed to supervise state banks that join the Federal Reserve
System (state member banks), nationally chartered banks, and BHCs. Id. § 321. The
OCC is an office within the United States Treasury Department that charters,
examines, and regulates nationally chartered commercial banks. 12 U.S.C. §§ 26,
93(a). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is the primary regulator
of state-chartered commercial banks that are non-members of the Federal Reserve
System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3).
492 [Vol. 6
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scope of incidental non-banking powers.4' For example, nationally
chartered banks generally may not conduct insurance activities,
but state-banking statutes may permit such activity' These are
significant factors when deciding whether a state or federal charter
best allows organizers to accomplish their objectives and
expectations.'
C. Fading Competition for Charters
The choices among charters and between state and federal
regulators imply that competition exists in the banking market for
chartering.' Organizers ultimately exercise business judgment in
determining which type of charter and which primary regulator
meet their goalsO4 Therefore, a chartering authority competing for
charter applications has an interest in offering a charter that
maximizes the power of an institution to engage the market, while
still ensuring safety and soundness.5" The ideal charter and
regulator grant powers to depository institutions liberally and
exercise discretion only to the extent that safety and soundness
require."
45. 12 U.S.C. § 24(seventh) (2000). Traditional non-banking busines3 activities
permitted for national banks have been determined to be those considered incidental
to the "business of banking." Id.
46. See, e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011-1015 (2000). But see 12
U.S.C. § 92.
47. See Malloy, supra note 34.
4S. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Bankhg System: A Model of Competition in
Regulation, 30 STAN. L. RExv. 1, 12 (1977) (positing that the ability of banks to choose
and to convert charters creates healthy competition among regulators).
49. See Malloy, supra note 34.
50. See Butler & Macey, supra note 33, at 677-79. The currently accepted
competitive theory follows the corporate charter model of competition, vhich is
aimed at maximizing profitability while maintaining a prudent business operation to
ensure the longevity of profit maldng. See id. However, federal preemption and
uniformity may be more descriptive of the American banking -system, thus
undermining the theory of charter and regulatory competition. Id. Competition has
taken the form of anticompetitive entry restriction into the banking industry instead
of the "regulatory forbearance" that a competitive environment would predict. Id.;
see also Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial
Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 65, 66-6 (1996) (discussing the -race to the
bottom").
51. See Garten, supra note 50, at 67.
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Charters have traditionally provided the separation of
financial services that distinguishes the banking industry." The
calls of the marketplace, however, induced changes, such as the
increased powers given to savings associations by the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA) and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982 (Garn-St. Germain).53 These Acts permitted thrifts to
offer transaction accounts and to expand their lending activities
beyond home mortgage loans.54 The expansion of powers blurred
the distinction among financial institutions and reflected the
market pressure on institutions to offer broader financial
services."
In addition to the blurring distinctions among charter types,
the differences between state and federal charters have diminished
considerably.56 The preemptive power of federal banking laws has
undermined the competition between state and federal charters."
The DIDMCA, which gave thrifts expanded powers, also made
state banks subject to the reserve requirements imposed by the
Federal Reserve System (Fed).5" That requirement eliminated the
advantage of state non-members banks in maintaining lower
52. See Causey, supra note 33, at 1.
53. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (ordering the phase out of Regulation Q interest rate
ceilings for banks and thrifts that had placed banks and thrifts at a competitive
disadvantage with mutual funds not subject to ceilings); Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (accelerating
the phase out).
54. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 39, at 106.
55. See Causey, supra note 33, at 3 (predicting that the nomenclature of financial
services providers will disappear because consumers do not care what the charter
calls the entity, rather consumers are concerned with what products and services are
available and whether they are insured); Markham, supra note 2, at 240-45. Banks
and savings associations suffered from regulatory restraints and disintermediation
throughout the 1970s, which left these institutions unable to compete amongst each
other and with non-bank institutions that held an advantage by not being subject to
the scrutiny of bank regulators. Id.
56. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 39, at 1, 181-83,212.
57. See Butler & Macey, supra note 33, at 693-94.
58. See First Bank and Trust Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 605 F.
Supp. 555, 558 (E.D. Ky. 1984) (reviewing the legislative history of the DIDMCA
and finding that a principle purpose was to equalize reserve requirements between
member banks and non-member banks due to "bank flight" from the Reserve
System).
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reserves5 9 The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(CEBA) undercut competition further by applying sections 20 and
32 of the Glass-Steagall Act to state non-member banks. 9
Although GLBA repealed those sections, the ability of federal
banking laws to preempt state banking laws remains intact.6"
For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) limited the activities of state-
chartered banks as principals to those permitted for nationally
chartered banks.62
Taken together, CEBA and FDICIA elucidate the
predicament of banking institutions trying to maximize earning
power by choosing the most permissive regulator"3 The choice
between a state charter and national charter is no longer
significantly determined by the powers that one charter grants
over the other because the powers will generally be the same.
The principle that the dual banking system depends on a
meaningful choice between charters has induced state banking
systems to look at modernizing their banking laws." Since the
advantage of offering broader banking power has been
undermined, their charters must offer something else to attract
depository institutions." Many states have decided to offer an
59. Id
60. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 101)0-86, § 103, 101
Stat. 552, 566-567; Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
61. See Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, § 20, 4-8 Stat. 188. repealed by Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act § 101. GLBA repealed sections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of
1933. ld.
62. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act. Pub. L No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236. However, state-chartered banks may still engage in agency
activities permitted by respective state laws, as well as obtain permission by the
Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to exercise powers beyond those
permissible to national banks if the FDIC deems the institutions well-capitalized and
finds that the activity for which the bank applied does not threaten the federal
deposit insurance fund. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(a)(1) (20)00).
63. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 39, at 183. See generally Butler &
Macey, supra note 33 (arguing against the theory of competition within the dual
banking system and questioning the underlying premise of maintaining such a
system).
64. See BROOmE & MARKHAM, supra note 39, at 183.
65. See Johnson supra note 18, at 361.
66. See id. at 362 (discussing the role that the state banking system has played in
the dual banking system by developing new services, innovating products, allowing
20021
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innovative form of competitive equality and regulatory
simplification.67
D. Parity Statutes
A parity statute is one method of accomplishing
competitive equality with national banks. 68 As the OCC granted
nationally chartered banks more powers, a disparity between state-
chartered banks and national banks occurred.69 The potential for a
continually growing disparity in banking powers between state and
national charters threatened the state system. 70 States needed to
develop the ability for state-chartered banks to remain competitive
with the nationally chartered banks without the delay of the
legislative process.7" Consequently, at least forty-seven states have
passed statutes that provide for parity in order to compete with
nationally chartered banks.72
Generally, a parity statute is passed by state legislatures to
offer competitive equality between state and federal charters,
although they are not typically self-executing.73 A "super parity"
statute takes an additional step by permitting state banks to
states to address the specific credit needs of their communities, and providing a check
and balance on the regulatory power of the OCC).
67. See id.
68. Id. at 361.
69. See id. at 356-58.
70. Id. at 366. Parity statutes are written to grant the same powers to state banks
that national banks have. Id. However, parity statutes may also be written to grant
parity between banks and other financial institutions in that state, between a state
and other state systems, or among depository institutions within a state. See id. at
370-72.
71. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 366.
72 A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING, CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK
SUPERVISORS 204-06 (18th ed. 2000) [hereinafter PROFILE]. Iowa and North Carolina
have not passed parity statutes and South Carolina did not report. Id. Generally, the
parity statute is passed by state legislatures to offer competitive equality between
state and federal charters. See, e.g., 1961 Ill. Laws 2361 (codified as amended at 205
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5 (West 1993)); 1967 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 74, § 1 (codified as
amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1715 (Supp. 2000)); 1969 Minn. Laws 1129, art. 4, §
9 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 48.15(2) (Supp. 1988)); 1967 Mo. Laws, S.B.
1, § A (codified as amended at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 362.105 (West 1997)).
73. Id. at 370. These statutes may be written to grant competitive equality with
federal thrifts, as well. See PROFILE, supra note 72, at 204-06.
[Vol. 6496
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conduct the same activities as state banks in other states.74 Parity
statutes can be written in various forms; they may take effect
immediately or may require some affirmative action by banks or
the state legislature 5 However, parity statutes do not address
regulatory structure.7 6  Some parity statutes may also present
difficulties in their application, but these are generally matters of
drafting and interpretation. '  Therefore, states may prefer to
consider alternatives.
IV. THE UNIVERSAL CHARTER
A. Generally
The universal charter presents another possibility for
modernizing the state banking system. A universal charter is a
plan for organizational structure that reconciles the differences
among the traditional charters for depository institutions.' Under
74. See, e.g., 1961 IM. Laws 2361 (codified as amended at ILL Co'iP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 205, § 515 (25) (West Supp. 1999). A "super parity" statute offers competitive
equality among state institutions by authorizing a state's permissible banking
activities to expand vith another state's expansion of banking activities. Sce CSBS,
supra note 23, at S. This may prove burdensome, confusing, and uncertain becausE, in
order to effectuate this type of statute, state banks and the state regulator of thoue
banks must kmow what the permissible activities of the rest of the state systems are.
See generally Johnson, supra note 18 (describing various problems with parity
statutes).
75. See CSBS, supra note 23, at S. The CSBS recommends state policymakers
and bankers review parity statutes closely to ensure conformance with GLBA
provisions. Id. States may also consider w.hether parity statutes beNst address3 the
financial needs of local consumers. Id. Expansion assumes responsibility for the
continued integrity of the banldng system. Id. Some powers may not be appropriate
for state-chartered banks. Id. Parity statutes pose the problem of potentially
contradictory and unclear applicability of las. Id. Expressly written state banking
laws provide clarity and explicitness of state bank powers that parity statutes do not.
Id.
76. See Butler & Macey, supra note 33, at 706 (arguing that parity statutes reduce
the incentives to lobby legislatures for "regulatory forbearance" and give states a
"free ride on the lobbying efforts of national bank competitors").
77. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 372, 402-04 (discussing interpretive problems
and proposing a model parity statute designed to increase utility by addresing the
interpretive problems legislatures have experienced since the enactment of these
laws).
78. Testhnony on AB 563: Testimony to Assembly Commitce on Financial
Institutions (1999) (statement of David G. Anderson, Executive Assistant, Dept. of
Financial Institutions), available at http:fwwvwv.wdfi.orglnewsroomlegislativet
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a universal charter, financial institutions receive broad uniform
powers to deliver financial services, including powers previously
held by other financial institutions under specific charters.79 These
financial institutions, called universal banks, are an amalgamation
of the powers of commercial banks, savings banks, and savings
associations.8 0 In addition to combining traditionally distinct
charter powers, the universal charter may expand the business of
banking and thus move the financial services industry towards
integrated universal banking.8 '
The universal charter, although related, is not the same
financial services scheme as universal banking. 2  Universal
banking is an institutional arrangement of financial services within
an economy that range from deposit-taking and lending, trading of
financial instruments and foreign exchange, underwriting,
brokerage, investment management, and insurance. It is a
method of providing financial services that is practiced in some
form in most major economies.' Universal banking typically
imposes few restrictions on the business of banking and investing,
either through an integrated model or a subsidiary model.85 The
United States has implemented its version of universal banking
through the bank holding company (BHC) and the financial
holding company (FHC) models.8 6
testimony/ab563_anderson.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Anderson
Testimony].
79. Laura Pavlenko Lutton, Wisconsin Banks, Thrifts Push for Universal Charter,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 16, 1999, at 7.
80. Id. See generally infra notes 104-31 (describing Maine's universal charter).
81. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
82. See Richard P. Jones, Senator Says New Banking Rule Endangers Privacy,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 29, 2000, available at http://www.jsonline.com/bym/
News/aug0o/bank29082800.asp (last visited Feb. 25,2002).
83. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 7, at 84.
84. Id. at vi. Although universal banking was a term originally meant to
distinguish the German banks that provided commercial and investment banking
services from the "specialist" banks that offered only one type of service, today it
takes different forms. Id. at 86.
85. Id. at 84. The major forms are the integrated systems, such as the one in
Germany that permits a full range of financial activities to be performed by different
departments of the same universal bank, the subsidiary form, like the U.K. model
that allows for a broad range of activities performed through separate bank affiliates,
and the American model that requires holding companies and separately capitalized
subsidiaries. Id.
86. Id. The repeal of section 20 by GLBA moved the U.S. banking system
towards the U.K. model. See id. at 235.
498 [Vol. 6
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B. Universal Banking Under a Charter
Integrated universal banking and universal charters have
been considered and rejected in the federal system. However,
every state charters and regulates depository institutions that
organize under state banking laws." Therefore, individual states
can revise banking laws to permit universal banking."' They may
design charters that offer broader powers than those granted
under any of the traditional charters by expanding the scope of
activities that state regulators may approve.""' While this form of
charter allows institutions to respond to the changing demands of
the market, the objectives of safety and soundness and federal
preemption constrain the functionality of universal banking in the
current dual system.9' In order to reconcile a state's universal
banking system with the national banking system and other state
banking systems, that system must address the fundamental
concepts of the American financial services industry that are
believed to promote safety and soundness-
87. See, e.g., Banldng Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 4S Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15. 16. IS U.S.C.)
(rejecting integrated universal banking by separating commercial and investment
banking, but through different methods).
8S. See Malloy, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
89. State Banks Act on Financial Modernization as Congress Debates Bill, State
Bankers Say, 71 BANKING REP. (BNA) 207 (Aug. 3, 1993). However, any powers
beyond those authorized for national banks must pass FDICIA's requirements
placed on permissible activities for state banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act § 303. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a; supra note 62.
90. Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Beating Uncle Sam, Maine Adopts Single Charter
for Banks, Thrifts, AM. BANKER, June 11, 1997, at 3.
91. SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 4. Reform efforts and consideration
of universal banking has been rejected on the grounds that safety and soundness is
not protected as adequately as the current strategy of separating commerce and
banking. See id. at 4-5. In fact, "financial refor"' has become considered by some to
be an "oxymoron." Id. at 4.
92. See generally Rep. James A. Leach. Introduction: Modernization of Financial
Services, 25 J. CoRe. L. 681, 684-89 (2000) (setting forth the premises upon vhich
GLBA is based: (1) solidification of coramunity reinvestment obligations; (2)
expansion of competition in finance by increasing consumer access to a wider range
of products at affordable prices; (3) separation of commerce and banking; (4)
protection of privacy; (5) functional regulation; and (6) strengthening of international
competitiveness of American firms).
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C. Safety and Soundness of Universal Banking
Universal banking posits that the ability of financial
institutions to diversify among products and services contributes to
safety and soundness pursuant to the portfolio theory.93 The
counterargument suggests that non-bank activity expansions
expose the entire financial institution and its assets to risks that are
not congruent with the objective of ensuring safety and
soundness.94  Since both arguments rely on an amount of
speculation as to what the market will do, the analysis of the safety
and soundness of universal banking must include how it will be
regulated and what safety nets will prevent crises.95
Universal banking follows the rationale that within a free
market, competition provides the incentive to exercise sound
business judgments.96 In the pursuit of maximizing profits and
ensuring the long-term operation of the business entity, business
decisions require numerous considerations, such as efficiency, risk
reduction, and product expansion.97 "Market discipline" makes
customers, with their demands, and the institutional decision-
makers and managers, who will determine the prudence of any
activity, the strongest regulators of financial institutions in the
93. See Note, supra note 6, at 1322-23. Portfolio theory holds that diversification
of stocks (investments) prevents huge losses due to systemic risks. See William L.
Horton, Jr., The Perils of Universal Banking in Central and Eastern Europe, 35 VA. J.
INT'L L. 683, 686 (1995). Some argue that universal banks stabilize in the same way.
Id. at 686-87. If so, when traditional banking is less profitable, its other financial
ventures would sustain its bottom line. See id. at 687. Critics argue that ensuring
safety and soundness through diversification either is not possible or not likely due to
the co-varying nature of financial lines of business and management's increased risk
taking. Id. However, diversified assets and income may be less risky as a whole even
if the non-traditional bank activities are themselves riskier. Id. at 390.
94. See Note, supra note 6, at 1322-23.
95. See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 208. The three predominant
safety net features in the American banking system are deposit insurance, the
discount window, and payment system guarantees. Id. at 209-13. While these
features exist in other countries with universal banking, the muscle of universal
banking systems' safety nets is in capital requirements and early closure rules. Id. at
216-20.
96. Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital
Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195,211-12 (2000). Fiduciary
duties conferred on directors and officers by states potentially offer private
regulation of banking activities. Id. at 213. Because banks are privately held, duties,
such as business judgment, are imposed on the boards of banks. Id. at 213-14.
97. Id. at 211-12.
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universal banking system.93 In the event that business judgments
fail to provide adequate safety and soundness, the safety nets
become critical.99
Maine, which did not adopt universal banking per se,
implements a safety net feature by giving the superintendent of
financial institutions discretion to determine vhat is advantageous
to the public."'0 This discretion may be exercised in cases of
emergency, throughout the existence of a financial entity, in order
to ensure the public interest in financial strength and stability,
including the early or partial closure of an institution.' Such
discretion provides a safety net against excessively risky business
judgments."2 Other safety nets include capital requirements,
deposit insurance, and the discount window.0 3
98. Id "Market discipline" is the ability of private providers of banking capital
to affect bank behavior, including excessive risk taking. I& The key to safeguarding
universal banking systems is the interest banks have in keeping their diverse ventures
healthy. See Markham, supra note 2, at 2S2-83. The fear that universal banks put
profit ahead of security (to security's detriment) may be irrational. See SAUNDERS &
WALTER, supra note 7, at 128-29. The same factors that create profit, efficiency,
stability, and diversification, also create security. Sec id. The American
banking experience demonstrates that its protectionist-banking scheme is not
foolproof. See id. Risk inherently pervades economic structure. Sce id. The market
rewards efficient businesses, which is precisely the benefit of allowing banks to
operate like other commercial enterprises. See Markham, supra note 2, at 252-83. In
this way, market forces promote a self-regulating mechanism that mitigates risk. See
SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 129 n.3.
99. See generally SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 203-27 (discussing the
need for safety net reform in the United States, regardless of whether universal
banking is adopted).
100. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
101. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 152 (1997).
102. See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 236. FDICIA embodied the
concept of early closure of banks based on their capital ratios. Sce Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236. The Act associated the expansion of powers given to a bank with its capital
ratios. See id.
103. See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 214-1h. Capital requirements
refer to ratios of bank capital to its liabilities. Se BROOE & MARKHAMI, supra note
39, at 518. How well a bank is capitalized determines whether it is operating under
minimum standards consistent with the risks of its activities. See, e.., 12 U.S.C. §
1843(l)(1) (2000) (requiring BHCs to be well-capitalized in order to qualify as
financial holding companies); 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(C) (requiring banks to be well-
capitalized in order to exercise the expanded powers available under GLBA).
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
D. Maine's Universal Bank Charter
The State of Maine provides a model of a universal
chartering system.'O In response to nationwide interstate banking
and branching for federally chartered banks that would create
competition for Maine's community banks, the Legislature
substantially revised the Maine Banking Code in 1997,105 creating
the Universal Bank Charter. 1°6  A group of industry
representatives, Maine's Bureau of Financial Institutionsl °7 staff,
and members of the legal community studied Maine's Banking
Code and universal banking.0 8 The six-month study produced
legislation that offered broad, uniform powers to all state-
chartered commercial banks, saving banks, and savings and loan
associations, renamed universal banks."'9 The distinctions among
each institution's separate charter were eliminated for universal
banks so that these institutions may exercise any of the existing
powers belonging to a commercial bank, savings bank, or thrift."0
Also, the scope of activities that the regulators may approve now
includes what is, "convenient and useful," to the business of
banking."' The superintendent of the Bureau of Financial
104. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that Maine did not adopt
universal banking per se).
105. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B.
106. See id. § 131.47 (defining a "universal bank" as an investor-owned or a mutual
financial institution, including trust companies, savings banks, and specially chartered
thrifts, authorized by its organizational documents to exercise enumerated activities
within Part 4 of the statute).
107. See id. § 121 (changing the "Bureau of Banking" to the "Bureau of Financial
Institutions," as of Jan. 1, 2002).
108. Press Release, Maine Bureau of Banking, Governor King Signs Universal
Charter Bill, at http://www.state.me.us/pfr/bkg/ubcpress.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2002).
109. Id.
110. Id. Credit unions were not affected by the universal bank charter law. de
Senerpont Domis, supra note 90, at 3.
111. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 131.6-A. The "convenient and useful"
activities are those that are "reasonably related to the operation of a financial
institution or are financial in nature." Id. The section lists activities that are per se
reasonably related to the operation of a financial institution, such as real estate-
related services, tax planning and preparation, insurance related services, securities
brokerage, and consumer services. Id. Activities permitted under the Bank Holding
Company Act (BHCA) are per se closely related and permissible. Id. The list may
be expanded by the superintendent. Id.
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Institutions explained, "'[w]e needed to control the safety-and-
soundness side, not to manage the bank.....a
The rationale behind Maine's adoption of a universal bank
charter emphasized that commercial banks, savings banks, and
thrifts are in the same business."' The Legislature considered a
universal charter an appropriate mechanism for providing state-
chartered financial institutions "the powers and flexibility to meet
changing market demands and utilize new technology for delivery
of financial services," which would make Maine an attractive place
for establishing financial institutions."' Maine's universal charter
expanded organizational options to include limited partnerships,
limited liability partnerships, and limited liability companies."' It
eliminated statutory restrictions on the days and hours of
operations." 6 Furthermore, it broadened lending and deposit
authority, thus eliminating restrictions on savings banks and
thrifts, such as the prohibition against paying interest on demand
deposits."7 Also, the universal charter eliminated limitations on
commercial and industrial firms acting as financial holding
companies" A streamlined notification process makes it possible
for well-capitalized and well-managed institutions to establish
branches or operating subsidiaries."' The universal charter also
112. de Senerpont Domis, supra note 90, at 3 (quoting Donald DeMatteis, ,ho
further stated that, "'[t]his law takes the best of existing powers and makes them
available for everybody'). Id.
113. See Press Release, Maine Bureau of Banking, supra note 103. Traditionally,
they offer transaction accounts and financial intermediation. See generally BROOiME
& MARKHAm, supra note 39, at 141 (explaining the difference between banks and
other financial institutions).
114. See Press Release, Maine Bureau of Banking, supra note 103.
115. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 311.
116. 1& 8§ 145.2 (repealed 1997).
117. IeL §§ 521-526 (repealed 1997).
118. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2341-2-45 (repealed l97).
119. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 446-A. This Section authorizes financial
institutions to engage in activities, directly or indirectly, unless the superintendent
determines that a subsidiary's independent legal structure is necessary to ensure the
safety and soundness of the institution. Id. The application is made pursuant to
section 252 procedures for conducting closely related activities. Id. § 446-A.1 Waiver
of application applies when an institution is well-capitalized and well-managed. h. §
446-A.1.A.-B(1), (2). The superintendent determines whether the institution is well
capitalized. Id. § 446-A.1.A Well-managed means that the Bureau of Financial
Institutions gave a composite rating of at least one or two (pursuant to the Bureau's
uniform rating system) in the last examination and that the institution is at least
satisfactorily managed. IdL § 446-A.1.A.-B(1), (2).
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allows for limited purpose banks, including merchant banks, 2 °
non-depository trust companies, 2 1 and holding companies of
uninsured banks.2
A unique function of universal charter is that it expressly
anticipates permissible banking activities of the future. When
Maine adopted universal charter, federal law banned or strictly
limited certain provisions, such as unlimited securities
underwriting, ownership of banks by commercial companies,
payment of interest on business checking accounts, and the
establishment of wholesale financial institutions. 2 3  These
provisions may not take effect unless and until Congress permits
them. 24 Thus, Maine's financial institutions will be primed to take
advantage of changes in federal law without delay, while other
depository institutions chartered under other states' laws may be
unable to engage in an expansion of permissible activities at the
federal level unless and until a state statute specifically authorizes
it."z  This approach promotes parity with nationally chartered
banks and with other state banks permitted under respective state
law. 26
Such expansive powers raise the question of whether safety
and soundness are sufficiently protected.'27 Maine's declaration
120. See id. § 1221.
121. See id. § 1211.
122. See id. § 1239.
123. See 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994) (repealed 1999); § 377 (repealed 1999) (barring
affiliations between member banks and securities firms). Wholesale financial
institutions, called "woofies" were not allowed under federal law until Congress, with
the passage of GLBA, settled on a regulatory regime that fit woofies into functional
regulation. See Leslie Wayne, Push for Wholesale Bank Stalls in Overhaul of Law,
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1999, at C2. Woofies are banks that are restricted to minimum
wholesale deposits, but otherwise function as commercial banks. Id. They do not
receive deposit insurance, but do have access to the Federal Reserve's discount
window. Id.
124. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified at scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.) (providing the current
status of permissible financial activities).
125. de Senerpont Domis, supra note 90, at 3.
126. See id.
127. See e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 1322-23. Reform attempts began almost as
soon as the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, due to the belief that the Act was an
overreaction. See Leach, supra note 92, at 683. The complete divorcement of
commercial and investment banking continued for nearly seventy years because the
concept of safety and soundness in the American banking system rests on such a
belief among bankers and policymakers. Id. at 682-83. GLBA took a step towards
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of policy requires that the Bureau of Financial Institutions
supervise all financial institutions, "in a manner to ensure the
strength, stability,... efficiency... [and] reasonable and orderly
competition, thereby encouraging the development and expansion
of financial services advantageous to the public welfare; and to
maintain close cooperation with other supervisory authorities." '1 :
Decision-making regarding applications for transactions involving
financial institutions belongs to the superintendent, but requires
that certain criteria be considered Y in order to ensure that the
proposed transaction, "contributes to the financial strength and
success of the financial institution or institutions concerned, and
promotes the convenience and advantage of the public."'" The
new charter also grants emergency power to the superintendent.'
E. Universal Bank Charters in Other States
Other states have considered universal charter legislation
as a mechanism to modernize financial services regulation. -"2 The
reconciling banking and commerce. Id. at 684. Bankers and policymakers appear to
be considering the possibility of safety and soundness achievable vhile joining
commerce and banking. See id. at 683. See generally John S. Barry, Creating a
Financial Services Industry for the 21st Century Part 1: Tear Down the Walls,
HERTAGE FOUND. REP., Jul. 5, 1996, at 1, 4-5, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File
(arguing that studies have shown that integrated banking and commerce in a free
market economy is safer, and less prone to failure, and that the BHC structure has
not proven to be any safer than the integration of banking and commerce).
128. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 111 (1997).
129. Id. at § 253.2. The superintendent shall also consider factors such as:
(1) "character, ability, and overall efficiency of the management," id. § 253.2.A;
(2) "adequacy of capital and financial resources," id. § 253.2.B; (3) "competitive
abilities and future prospects," id. § 253.2.C: (4) "convenience and needs of the
market area," id. at § 253.2.E; and (5) "competitive effect of the proposed
transaction, and "likely impact of the proposed transaction on other financial
institutions," id. at § 253.2.F.
130. Id. at § 253.1.A. The superintendent must weigh the benefits, such as
increased competition or efficiency, against the possible costs, such as "unsafe and
unsound practices." Id. at § 253.1.B (emphasis added).
131. Id. § 152.1. If the Governor declares a banking emergency pursuant to
section 151, then the superintendent, during the period of the banking emergency,
may restrict banking transactions, including early or partial closure. Id. The statute
calls for cooperation between the governor and the superintendent in determining
when to resume normal banking transactions. Id.
132. See infra notes 133-146 and accompanying text. Wisconsin has repeatedly
attempted to pass a universal charter bill. See, e.g., A.B. 563, 2000 Leg., 93rd Sess.(Wis. 2000).
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Wisconsin Assembly is expected to enact a "universal certification
option" in the 2001-2002 legislative session.'33 In recognition of
the fading distinctions among depository institutions, the bill
attempts to level the playing field between banks and savings
associations by creating parity among the charters of state-
chartered financial institutions."3 According to the Administrator
of the Division of Banking, the bill contains three main
components and objectives of the bill:
As its first objective, the bill establishes parity
between all state-chartered financial institutions.
The second objective is to expedite the "parity
power" review process. Although Wisconsin has a
"parity" statute for state-chartered banks, the
requirements of the statute dictate a time
consuming and burdensome rule making procedure
to access the additional banking powers.
Furthermore, the lengthy rule making procedure
can be a significant competitive disadvantage for
state-chartered banks seeking parity with their
national bank counterparts. The new bill will allow
institutions that opt for universal certification to
apply for increased powers using an emergency
hearing, thereby, increasing the responsiveness of
the Division of Banking and giving state-chartered
institutions the opportunity to effectively compete
with national banks. The third component of the
bill concerns the expansion of enumerated
133. Telephone Interview with Michael J. Mach, Banking Administrator, Wis.
Dept. of Financial Institutions (Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Mach Interview]; see A.B.
299, 2002 Leg., 95th Sess. (Wis. 2002). A controversial wage-lien law that puts
lenders ahead of former employees in a company's bankruptcy distribution was
attached to the bill, which resulted in derailment of the bill at the last minute. Paul
Gores, Wisconsin Legislators, Finance Leaders Support Regulator, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 29, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, BANNWS File. The Legislature is
expected to work on a compromise in order to pass the bill. Id.
134. See generally Laura Pavlenko Lutton, Eye on the States: Wisconsin Banks and
Thrifts Seek a Uniform State Charter, AM. BANKER, Mar. 20, 1998, at 6 (considering
the universal charter as a necessary step in competing with national banks' expansion
of powers because of the perceived threat to Wisconsin's financial services industry
(banks and thrifts, especially) and the dual banking industry, in general).
506 [Vol. 6
CHARTERS AND FEES
"financial activity" powers and general
administrative issues.'35
Wisconsin's universal certification option modifies the
approach taken in Maine by creating "hybrid state-chartered
institutions."'36 The certification is not mandatory and the
institutions that opt for the certification do not have to change
their corporate governance to receive benefits under universal
certification. 137 However, the purposes reflected the same goal of
maintaining a safe and sound system of financial services while
offering parity and competitiveness."'  The executive vice
president and CEO of the Wisconsin Bankers Association
expressed the heightened interest in matching the powers of
nationally chartered institutions after the passage of GLBA by
stating, "'[t]rue reform cannot be achieved unless the Wisconsin
Legislature passes legislation that gives state-chartered institutions
parity.' 39
Like Wisconsin, recent reforms in Michigan indicate that
universal banking is in its future. 1 '4 In 1993, the banking
commissioner determined to make Michigan a bank-friendly
state. 14' Since then, exam fees were lowered, branching
restrictions for well-capitalized banks were eliminated, and thrifts
were granted parity with their nationally chartered counterparts.'42
The reforms induced several institutions to switch to Michigan's
state charter. 43  Following the charter-flips, institutions
135. Mach Interview, supra note 133.
136. See Douglas Armstrong, State Bankers Pushing Bill for Pariy, MILV, t EL
J. SENTINEL, Nov. 12, 1999 (describing these "hybrids" as the incorporation of the
features from commercial banks, savings banks, and thrifts, which is distinguishable
from re-chartering under a universal charter), available at http:lU',ww,.jsonline.conI
bymfNewsfnov99bankl2llll99.ap (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
137. Mach Interview, supra note 133.
138. See Anderson Testimony, supra note 78.
139. Armstrong, supra note 136.
140. Laura Pavlenko Lutton, Michigan Regulator Goes to Bat for State's Banks,
Am. BANiER, Oct. 16, 1998. at 4.
141. 1L
142. Mich. Banking Commissioner Leaving for Greener Pastures, AM,. BAKER,
June 28, 1999, at 4 (crediting the commissioner for modernizing Michigan's banldng
system by eliminating the red tape, thus making the Michigan bank charter more
attractive).
143. Lutton, supra note 140, at 4. An Indiana-based CNB Bancshares sw itched
charters it ovned in Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Illinois to one Michigan
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experienced savings in taxes, in exam fees, and on regulatory costs
without sacrificing their financial services powers."
In 1999, the commissioner planned to take more
affirmative steps in modernizing Michigan's financial services
industry, including a proposal for universal banking legislation that
would grant uniform, broad powers to depository institutions.141
The commissioner's resignation in mid-1999 may have delayed
universal banking in Michigan, but it appears likely that
Michigan's financial modernization is heading towards universal
banking.146
Michigan's example draws attention to another feature of
the universal charter, which is its effect on bank regulation.
Blurred distinctions among charters implicate the regulation of
those institutions significantly because of the fact that regulation
was designed specifically for and developed around a particular
type of charter.147 Also, in terms of functional regulation,
determining who is the appropriate regulating entity may become
increasingly difficult as charter differences fade. 41
In their attempts to offer something else, states must
look at the regulatory structure for state-chartered banks.
49
charter for its $6.9 billion bank. Id. The banks expected to save annually $1.9 million
in taxes and regulatory fees, as well as expand its insurance business. Id. Between
1995 and 1998, at least twenty-four new banks chose a Michigan charter. Id.
144. Id. CFSB Bancorp, an $850 million-asset company, saved $80,000.00 in exam
fees in the first year after switching its national thrift charter to a Michigan charter.
Id.
145. Id.
146. See Mich. Banking Commissioner Leaving for Greener Pastures, supra note
142, at 4.
147. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 795-96.
148. See generally Markham, supra note 2 (discussing functional regulation in the
context of the current financial services environment). Functional regulation is the
regulation of activities by the same regulator regardless of the entity engaging in
those activities. Id. at 277. Professor Jerry W. Markham suggests reconsidering the
functional, product-based regulatory model because financial services are being
offered across traditionally functional and institutional lines. Id. at 279-80,285.
149. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 797. The traditional "regulatory paradigm" must
be restructured to take into account the transformation the financial services industry
has undergone during the twentieth century and the implications for the future. Id.
at 797-78. The theory proposes that the underlying structure of an industry
"'define[s] the context in which the regulatory agencies have operated."' Id. at 797
(quoting Pulitzer Prize winner, Thomas McGraw). The logical flow of this argument
is that the regulation of an industry should change with change in the regulated
[Vol. 6
2002] CHARTERS AND FEES 509
Regulation reform inherently involves consideration of agency
consolidation.' By combining the powers of depository
institutions, a universal charter could consolidate the different
regulatory agencies into one. 5' A single agency could perform
uniform and broad supervision, examination, and discretion over
all depository institutions. 52  The unification of resources and
experiences should lower regulatory costs, making regulation of
depository institutions more cost effective and less burdensome." 3
This presents an especially attractive feature in light of the
expense of operating under a federal charter.'4
V. SHOULD NORTH CAROLINA CONSIDER A
UNIVERSAL CHARTER?
A. Competitive Advantage
North Carolina's banldng laws historically offer
competitive banldng powers, maling the state a dominant force in
the banking industry.' The State has accomplished its place in
industry because the industry itself determines "regulatory opportunities and
constraints." Id. at 798.
150. Michele Heller, Why This Try at Agency Reform Just Might Fly, AM,1.
BANKER, Nov. 26, 2001, at 1. According to president of the Independent Community
Bankers of America, Kenneth A. Guenther, "If you're raising questions about the
whole structure, and you're asking the industry to work with you to come up with a
better structure, you're opening up the whole issue of rationalization.... It could
lead to the merging of regulatory agencies."' Id. (quoting Kenneth A. Guenther).
151. Taylor, supra note 13, at 801-02. This regulatory reform should take into
account any differences that still exist among product lines and vhatever institutional
boundaries impact regulation. Id. Organizational restructuring should not be the
sole aspect of financial modernization; rather, regulation itelf must address the
changing marketplace and its impact on depository institutions. See id.
152- See generally Martin E. Lyebecker, The "South Dakota" Experience and the
Bush Task Group's Report Reconciling Perceived Overlaps in the Dual Regulation of
Banking, 53 BROOi. L. REv. 71, 84-88 (1987) (discussing the recommendations of the
Bush Task Group set forth in 1984, which were to enhance state power and achieve
regulatory efficiency by consolidating the federal regulation of national commercial
banks into one regulator and by transferring state regulation of state banks to the
states if the state regulatory agency provided comparable regulation to federal
regulatory counterparts).
153. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual
Banking System, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 263,266 (1996).
154. See Justin Fox, OCC v the States-Stampede Toward State Charters Makes
the OCC Change Its Tune, AM. BANKER, Aug. 2S, 1995, at 5.
155. In Terms of Regional Banking in the Southeast, Florida's Loss Has Been
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the banking industry without enacting a parity statute.'56 In its
place are broad statutes authorizing banks to engage in a variety of
financial activities, at the banking commissioner's discretion."7
While this approach has worked well, the future of banking will
require more certainty and responsiveness due to high-tech
banking and the need to service customers where they are when
they need it.'58 Experience shows that if the pace of business, or
other consumer needs, exceeds the ability of North Carolina's
banks to provide the demanded services and other institutions
offer such services, the market will cause state-chartered
institutions to lose customers. 1
59
A universal charter offers North Carolina an opportunity to
address the disparity between national and state banks without
passing a parity statute. The charter may expand institutional
powers to include activities traditionally assigned to particular
institutions under specific charters and enumerate new powers
available to all institutions under the charter.60 The charter may
also be written so that permissible financial activities are
determined by the broader set of powers, whether the broader set
is national or state law.'6' The powers not explicitly authorized by
the state may be subjected to a legislative review process or to the
commissioner's discretionary review."' The review process couldbe designed with the Wisconsin "emergency hearing" procedure in
North Carolina's Gain, AM. BANKER, Oct. 9, 1985, at 24. North Carolina's friendly
banking climate, branching powers, and "hands off" bank expansion policy made the
State a predominant player in the Southeast and laid the foundation for North
Carolina's role in nationwide branching. Id. The strategy was to establish super-
regional banks that could compete with national banks when nationwide branching
became allowed. See id.
156. See Id. Instead, the State has enacted liberal banking powers and approached
banking as an industry that must offer attractive features, rather than merely offering
competitive equality with other systems. See id.
157. See generally PROFILE, supra note 72 (listing for comparison state banking
laws among the fifty states)
158. See The Year 2000 in the USA: Re-defining the Goalposts, DISTRIBUTION
MGMT. BRIEFING, Dec. 28, 2000, at 8, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
159. See id.
160. See generally supra notes 78-154 (describing the ability to draft state charters
in a permissive way).
161. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 371-72.
162. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
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mind, which is the result of Wisconsin's own experience with a
parity statute that proved inadequately responsive. I"3
In fact, the universal charter may go beyond parity and
offer powers that may be desirable to an institution, even if
currently prohibited.' 6' A universal bank may not be able to
conduct all of the activities permitted by the universal charter." '
However, it could anticipate and prepare for immediate expansion
once its charter powers become permissible."' This feature offers
the advantage of responsiveness in the age of high technology,
which is an area where North Carolina's banks lead."
B. Changes in the Market for Separate Charters
As the distinctions among institutional powers blur and
fade, the charters lose their significance as meaningful indicators
of what to expect from the institution.'' The thrift industry, for
example, was designed to foster housing finance availability.""'
However, the decline of the thrift industry's role in supporting and
developing the housing market reflects the market's changing
nature. 70 Since 1996, the number of savings institutions in North
Carolina has dropped from sixty-one to forty-one, which is
indicative of the diminished role these institutions have in the
State's economy. 7 At the same time, "fringe banking," a less
163. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
164. See de Senerpont Domis, supra note 90. at 3.
165. Id.
166. Id
167. See Michael A. Stegman, Banking the Unbankld: Untapped Market
Opportunities for North Carolina's Financial Institutions, 5 N.C. BANii,'Nli INST. 23. 28
(2001) (citing Top 50 Bank Holding Companies in Autoited Teller Machines, A,.
BANKER, Dec. 6, 1999, at 12A). The American Banker reported that five of North
Carolina's banks are in the top fifty of BHCs in ATM ownership and four are in the
nation's top 100 banks for web influence. Id.
168. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
169. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A UNIFIED FEDERAL CHARTER FOR BANKS AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION: A STAFF STUDY, 10 BANKING REv. 1 (1997). available at
http:/lv.wwTv.fdic.govlbanklanalyticallbankingll997summfunified.html (last updated
Jul. 14,1999) (last visited Feb. 25,2002).
170. Id.
171. State Banking Peifornzance Swninzary, Q. BNKING PROFILE (Sept. 30, 2601),
http:/wwT.fdic.govfmdex.html (clicking on Quarterly Banking Profiles) (last visited
Feb. 25,2002). Total assets and total deposits have decreased for both nationally and
state-chartered savings associations, indicating that the reduction in the numbz.r of
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regulated, parallel financial services industry, is booming. 7 2 This
trend indicates potential for growth in the mainstream financial
services market.17 3 A universal charter could reconcile the reduced
need for thrifts and the increased demand for a parallel system of
financial services.174 The flexible charter would allow financial
institutions to adjust to market forces without regard to traditional
charter limitations.1 75 It may also encourage banks to tap the
"unbanked" market by making such undertaking profitable, and
thus extend the protection of mainstream industry regulation to
lower-income communities.
176
C. Regulatory Efficiency
The small number of savings institutions in North Carolina
makes their regulation less cost effective. 177 In 1995, the outgoing
banking commissioner recommended the consolidation of bank,
thrift, and credit union regulation. 7 1 In 2001, the General
savings associations is not the result of consolidation within the industry through
mergers and acquisitions. Id.
172. Stegman, supra note 167, at 28.
173. Id. Fringe banking primarily serves lower-income communities through a
national network of check cashing centers and payday lenders. Id. Although such
services are banned in nineteen states, North Carolina has been fertile ground for
fringe banking. Id. at 28-29. One check cashing outlet or payday lender exists for
every two FDIC-insured banking offices. Id. at 29.
174. See supra note 55 and accompanying text; infra note 188 and accompanying
text.
175. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
176. See Stegman, supra note 167, at 45-46. The suggestion that some banks and
thrifts cannot profitably serve the financial needs of lower-income customers could
be mitigated by a universal system that employs economies of scale and scope that
reduce operating costs and permits broader financial service powers. Id.; see also
SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 20-21.
177. Cf William L. Horton, Jr., The Perils of Universal Banking in Central and
Eastern Europe, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 683, 688 (1995). Lower regulation costs and
increased efficiency would result from one set of rules enforced by one regulating
agency. Id. Although the argument refers to a dual banking system, the analogy
applies to combining agencies within one part of a dual banking system, such as a
state's system. Id. The agency could reduce the time and uncertainty associated with
different charters that are blurring in their distinctions from one another. Id.
178. Banking Commissioner Says Three Agencies Should Merge, WILMINGTON
MORNING STAR, Feb.7, 1995, at 5C (quoting William Graham). Consolidating credit
union regulation into regulation of banks and savings associations may prove more
difficult considering the political clout credit unions hold if they remain separate
entities, especially in North Carolina where the North Carolina State Employees'
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Assembly took a step in this direction by merging the regulation of
savings institutions into the banking commission.' According to
America's Community Bankers (ACB), however, "'regulatory
restructuring should be part of a broader effort.., to create a
more modern charter for depository institutions by combining the
best features of banking and thrift charters."""tO
The merger of the Savings and Loan Division into the
Banking Commission does not, however, involve harmonization of
the different charters."' This presents a question for maintaining
the supervisory focus of savings associations as the regulatory
environment of commercial banks absorbs them.Yc Savings
associations' traditional business is substantially different from
commercial banks' and the regulation of their businesses has
Credit Union (SECU) is the second largest credit union in the nation. See NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION OF CREDIT UNIONS, 2001 MID-YEAR STATISTICS FOR FEDERALLY
INSURED CREDrr UNIONS (June 30, 2001). available at http:flw,.ncua.govrefi
Statistics!midyear2001.pdf (showing $7,521,903,954.00 in assets as of June 30, 20U9)
(last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
179. 2001 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 193. The Governor of North Carolina, on June
12, 2001, authorized changes to section 53-93.1 of the North Carolina General
Statutes that merge the Savings and Loan Division into the Banking Commission. Id.
The commissioner will report to the governor on behalf of both entities and has
appointment power of new deputy commissioners for the Savings and Loan Division.
Id. Section 19 mandates a study of charter and regulatory options for North
Carolina's state-chartered banks and savings institutions; it states:
The Commissioner of Banks shall study the issue of regulation of
state-chartered banks and savings institutions and develop a plan
to regulate those banks and savings institutions in the most
effective, efficient, and equitable manner. The study shall include
a consideration of various financial charter options and the
feasibility and advisability of reorganizing the bank and savings
institutions regulatory agency to a cabinet level status. After the
State Banking Commission has approved the plan, the
Commission shall report the plan and any legislative
recommendations or proposals to implement the plan to the
General Assembly on or before May 1. 2002.
Id.
180. Prepared Testimony of James F. Montgomery Chairman, Americas
Community Bankers Washington D.C. and Chairman, Great Western Band:, FSB
Chatsworth, California Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, FED. NEWS SERVICE, May 2, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, REGPUB File
[hereinafter Prepared Testimony].
18L Id.
182. Id.
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developed out of their specialized functions.'83 Therefore, without
charter reform, this approach to regulatory reform must consider
the diversity of its institutions by maintaining a staff that has the,
"'historical knowledge and expertise of the respective
agencies.'"184
D. Diversity
The universal charter does not seek to homogenize banking
institutions.185 Diversity strengthens the dual banking structure by
allowing community institutions to provide the services local
customers need, as well as by preventing excessive concentration
within the banking sector. 186  The universal charter permits
institutions to engage in activities once exclusively under the
traditional charters." 7 A universal bank, however, need not
engage in activities that are not profitable or prudent for that
particular bank.'88 Therefore, a universal charter promotes
diversity by allowing for a wider range of financial service
combinations. 89
The diverse options available under the universal charter
are potentially most advantageous to community banking. 9 '
Community banks reflect the diverse needs of customers."'9 Their
success depends on, "the ability to embrace change, the marriage
of high-touch and high-tech, and incentive compensation for sales
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Richard C. Breeden, deputy counsel of the Vice President of the United
States and staff director of the Bush Task Group, Remarks at the American Bar
Association's annual convention before the committee on federal securities
regulation, in Regulatory Reform: Treatmeny of Sumtoms Isn't Enough, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 24, 1983, at 4.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 90, 97, 98 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
190. See Community Banks Face Their Future, A.B.A. BANKING J., Apr. 1997, at
55. The ABA Community Bankers Council and the A.B.A. Banking Journal
conducted a survey of bankers nationwide that identified key factors in bank
competitiveness. Id. The survey found that the most important element of
competition is service, even above technological capabilities, ATMs, and financial
efficiency. Id.
191. Regulatory Reform: Treatmeny of Sumtoms Isn't Enough, supra note 185, at 4.
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and service."' 9 2 The universal charter offers these institutions the
choice of enumerated powers, which is absent from parity statutes,
and the flexibility to respond swiftly to market changes. 93 Such
empowerment may be a valuable feature for the growing number
of community banks in North Carolina. "4 The goal is to provide
state-chartered institutions the ability to provide customers with
the services they demand in an efficient, yet prudent way.' 9 North
Carolina's community banks stand to gain from reducing
regulatory burdens and costs, which is where the financial services
industry finds its strength, according to bankers nationwide. '
E. Drawbacks
The drawback of unifying charters and expanding the
powers mainly involves two criticisms. First, there is an argument
against unifying charters is that the market should determine when
the charter is obsolete."7 Unifying the charters may impede the
ability of individual institutions to determine their future
organization and remain in what has been a profitable endeavor
for that particular institution. 3
192. See supra note 190, at 55.
193. See supra notes 6S-77.
194. See John Reosti, N.C. Deal Intended to Secd a Sup. ('onunnity Bank, A!I.
BANKER, June 5, 2001, at 6. The article discusses the merger between tvwo North
Carolina banks, Catawba Valley Baneshares and First Gaston Bank of North
Carolina. Id. The president and CEO of Catawba Valley, R. Steve Aaron
considered the merger the groundwork for creating a "super community banking
company" (a community based holding company) in North Carolina." Id. Mr.
Aaron considered North Carolina a good place for building super community banks
because of the State's large number of young banks; forty-fiv e banks were founded in
1996 or later. Id. According to the executive vice president of the North Carolina
Bankers Association, Paul Stock, more than half of the State's sixty-six
state-chartered banks are less than three years old. I.
195. See supra note 190, at 55 (discussing the need for community banks to build a
"sales culture" so that, as the product line expands, cross-selling would provide sales
success for banks).
196. Id. The ABA Community Bankers Council and the ABA Banking Journal
conducted a survey of bankers nationwide that identified key factors in bank
competitiveness. Id. The survey found that the most important element of
competition is service, even above technological capabilities, ATMs, and financial
efficiency. Id.
197. A UNIFIED FEDERAL CHARTER FOR B.NKSI AND SA\vINGs ASSOCIATION: A
STAFF STUDY, supra note 169.
198. Id.
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Traditional banking structure provides the second
impediment to adopting a universal charter-maintaining the
status quo. 99 Several interests are staked on the current structure
of financial services." ° Restructuring implies changes that may
affect chartered institutions' grip on certain areas of the market.2"'
Special interests may serve as obstacles in achieving shared
powers. 2 ' However, if the financial service industry places its
customers first, it will make changes that provide better service
with the assurance that such service is safe and sound. 3 Those
changes may mean losses for some service providers and gains for
others, but the customers should benefit from such organizational
and regulatory decisions."
VI. CONCLUSION
Financial modernization in the national system provides
the impetus for states to compare their financial institutions
statutes with their national counterparts.0 5 Expanded powers for
nationally chartered banks create a competitive advantage for
those institutions in states that do not permit their state-chartered
banks to offer the same services." Therefore, a state must
empower its banks to offer competitive services to their customers
where the customers are and when their customers need them.20 7
A state should also limit its restraints on banking activities to those
199. Id.
200. Id.; see SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 229,236.
201. See Senator Phil Gramm, Speech at the SMU School of Law (Sept. 24, 1999),
in The New Banking Legislation: The Financial Modernization for the Twenty-First
Century, 53 SMU L. REv. 371, 371 (2000). The three pillars of the financial services
industry have been maintained because of the interests each sector has in keeping out
competition. Id. The competition has been inefficient and costly, which has resulted
in an American economy that resembles, "thin slices of Swiss Cheese." Id. (quoting
Sen. Phil Gramm).
202 Id.
203. See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 228-29. The need for financial
services reform should include economic considerations instead of political concerns.
Special interests have protected themselves rather than developing a financial
services industry that serves the nation's interests as a whole. Id.
204. Id.
205. See PROFILE, supra note 23, at 8.
206. See id.; Johnson, supra note 18, at 361-62.
207. See The Year 2000 in the USA: Re-defining the Goalposts, supra note 158, at 8.
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that are necessary to protect customers' assets.?" Such limitations
should ease regulatory burdens and costs.] '
A universal charter offers two observable advantages for a
state banking system. First, a universal charter can be designed to
provide competitive equality, but without the application problems
some states have experienced with parity statutes.1" The second
obvious advantage that a universal charter offers is the potential
for simplifying the regulatory structure within a state so that one
set of regulations applies to all depository institutions.-' One
regulator through uniform supervision and examination could
enforce that set of regulations.2 2 The result would be expanded
powers for all depository institutions included under the charter
and reduced regulatory costs for those institutions because of
greater regulatory efficiency.213
A universal charter also offers not-so-obvious advantages.
The ground must be fertile for growth, which in business terms
means that opportunities to meet market demands must be
available." 4 The financial services industry constantly eyes the
future, trying to anticipate the market so that it can respond to
new demands." 5 But, the regulation of the industry makes it
uncertain whether depository institutions will be permitted to take
advantage of those opportunities. -"
Providing depository institutions with the knowledge that
opportunities exist in the future proved beneficial in the past. For
example, North Carolina's lenient branching laws have been
credited as the reason for the State's flagship status in the
Southeast and as a dominant banking power in the nation."t 7 Once
208. See Garten, supra note 50, at 67.
209. See id.
210. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
211. See Horton, supra note 177, at 6S.
212- 1&
213. Id.
214. See generally Markham, supra note 2, at 232 (proposing that banks should b-
regulated by the market just as commercial business entities).
215. See In Terms qf Regional Banking in the Southeast, Florida's Loss Has Been
North Carolina's Gain, supra note 155, at 24; supra notes 93-93 and accompanying
text.
216. See supra notes 93-98, 215 and accompanying text; infra notes 217-19 and
accompanying text.
217. See In Terms of Regional Banking in the Southcast, Florida's Loss Has Bccn
North Carolina's Gain, supra note 155, at 24.
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interstate branching and nationwide branching became
permissible, North Carolina was in prime position."' Now, the
future of the financial services industry depends on how well the
dual system deals with expanded powers delivered by virtually
indistinguishable institutions.1 9
A state that offers its depository institutions a method of
organization that allows for expansive powers, for parity with
national banks, for diversity in the dual banking system, and for
regulatory efficiency contributes to the durability of the states' role
in the financial services industry. A universal charter features all
of these competitive tools. Therefore, it is a prime contender in
strategies to consider for empowering a state system to deal
realistically with the future of the financial services industry. As a
leader in the nation's banking industry, the universal charter
option provides one approach worth evaluating. This option offers
North Carolina a financial services industry that is responsive,
competitive, and profitable.2 '
KATHERINE E. HOWELL-BEST
218. See id.
219. See generally Causey, supra note 33 (considering the future of
indistinguishable charters).
220. See SAUNDERS & WALTER, supra note 7, at 230. The authors argue that the
American banking system functions below its potential, stating, "[a] first-rate
economic power needs a first-rate financial system." Id. at 236.
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